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The Right to Voice? 
Erik Lillquist ∗ 
It is a sign of an important book that it generates a multitude of 
responses from members of the legal academic community.  Christo-
pher Slobogin’s Proving the Unprovable is one such book.  Without any 
doubt, this is the most important piece to be written on the admissi-
bility of expert evidence on mental health issues in our generation.  
Like other readers of the book, I find much to admire in Professor 
Slobogin’s exposition of his position.
1
 
Nonetheless, I do find something with which to quibble.  Profes-
sor Slobogin, at least as I read him, asserts in Proving the Unprovable 
that the existing Supreme Court precedent gives the criminal defen-
dant what he labels a “right to voice.”
2
  I also understand Professor 
Slobogin to make a more normative claim: that such a right to voice 
for criminal defendants is a worthy policy goal.  In this Essay, I dis-
pute both points: not only is there no generalized right to voice that 
emanates from either the Constitution or its interpretation by the 
Supreme Court but also that such a generalized right would be a bad 
idea for American criminal justice. 
I. PROFESSOR SLOBOGIN AND THE RIGHT TO VOICE 
In both Proving the Unprovable and in his prior contribution to 
this Law Review,
3
 Professor Slobogin considers the rules that should 
govern the admissibility of expert testimony on matters of mental 
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 1 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Guilty v. Guiltiness: The Case Against Abandon-
ing the Search for Substantive Accuracy, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1031 (2008). 
 2 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 53 (2007). 
 3 Christopher Slobogin, Guilty v. Guiltiness: Experts, Mental States, and Acts, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1009 (2008). 
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health as they apply to two sorts of issues in criminal and quasi-
criminal cases: the culpability of the defendant and the future dange-
rousness of the convict (or potential confinee).  In general, Professor 
Slobogin contends that defense-proffered evidence from mental 
health professionals on both issues—again, the culpability of defen-
dants and the future dangerousness of convicts—meets the minimum 
test of relevancy under the general rules of evidence.  That is, such 
evidence is clearly relevant in the minimal sense required, for in-
stance, by Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Such 
evidence, however, has often (indeed, usually) not been admitted in 
courts because it does not meet the heightened standards for proba-
tiveness and reliability under the test for the admission of expert evi-
dence.  Professor Slobogin argues forcefully that such evidence 
should be admitted, notwithstanding the usual restrictions.  While 
that thesis is provocative in and of itself, I am not primarily con-
cerned with it in this Essay. 
Professor Slobogin acknowledges that the admission of such ex-
pert evidence would violate our generally proper normative commit-
ment to scientific validity for expert evidence.
4
  He argues, though, 
that our official commitment to the defendant’s right to voice, 
among other things, should override the criterion of scientific validity 
and allow the admission of such evidence.
5
  But what does such a 
“right” consist of? 
On this count, Proving the Unprovable is not completely clear.  
Certainly, Professor Slobogin is not suggesting that the right to voice 
is an absolute right of the defendant to put on any evidence he 
chooses.  Instead, my understanding is that the right to voice is the 
right of criminal defendants “to tell their story.”
6
  This clearly encom-
passes more than the right to testify recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Rock v. Arkansas. 
7
  In addition, the right to voice presumably 
is broader than its particular applications in Proving the Unprovable: al-
lowing the admission of otherwise inadmissible expert evidence on 
behalf of a defendant on issues of culpability and future dangerous-
 
 4 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 53.  Michael Risinger has suggested to me, and I 
agree, that we might question in general how great our actual—as opposed to theo-
retical—commitment to scientific validity actually is.  For purposes of Professor Slo-
bigin’s argument in Proving the Unprovable, he appears to assume that the commit-
ment is robust.  By saying that, I do not mean to suggest that he differs from Michael 
Risinger and myself in skepticism about our actual commitment here. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 54 (“defendants should be allowed to tell their story”); see also id. at 125 
(“to tell the best story they can about their future”). 
 7 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
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ness.
8
  Indeed, as I understand the right, it seems to suggest that it 
gives the defendant the right to submit any evidence on his behalf, 
unless “it is completely untrustworthy or so immune to the weapons 
of the adversarial process that its questionable nature is not likely to 
be exposed.”
9
 
In the following two Parts, I will first argue that there is no basis 
for this right in either the Constitution or the Supreme Court’s case 
law.  As part of this exposition, I will also argue that there is no exist-
ing constitutional right to present the sorts of evidence with which 
Professor Slobogin is concerned in Proving the Unprovable—evidence 
of culpability and future dangerousness.  Second, I will argue that 
there is no good policy argument in favor of a generalized right to 
voice.  I will not take a position on whether, as a policy matter, de-
fendants ought to have the ability to proffer otherwise inadmissible 
evidence of culpability and future dangerousness.
10
 
II. THE DESCRIPTIVE CASE AGAINST A RIGHT TO VOICE 
The first question is whether there is any support for a defen-
dant’s right to voice in the Supreme Court’s case law.
11
  I take it that 
Professor Slobogin’s argument is not that the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly recognized that a defendant has a right to voice in criminal 
proceedings.  It cannot be, for there is no evidence that the Court has 
ever explicitly recognized such a right.  For instance, a quick search 
 
 8 In order to support these particular applications of the right to voice, it follows 
that the underlying right, here the right to voice, must be more general. 
 9 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54. 
 10 As Professor Slobogin suggests in his reply to this Essay, the reality is that he 
and I are perhaps not all that far apart on these issues.  See Christopher Slobogin, The 
Right to Voice Reprised, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1647, 1648 (2010) [hereinafter Slobo-
gin, The Right to Voice Reprised].  While I remain unconvinced that there is a constitu-
tional right to present the sort of evidence he is primarily discussing, I remain open-
minded about whether such evidence should be admitted as a strict matter of eviden-
tiary and criminal justice policy.  Certainly his discussion of this issue in Parts I & II of 
his response further strengthens the case for such a change to policy.  Just because it 
may well be good policy, however, does not mean that it should be constitutionally 
required. 
In addition, we remain (somewhat) divided about the existence of a more gen-
eral right to voice.  Although he sets forth strong and forceful arguments for such a 
right (which I still do not accept!), he admits that he is “ambivalent about a robust 
right to present a defense that permits virtually any evidence he or she desires.”  Id. 
at 1662. 
 11 Again, to be clear, Professor Slobogin explicitly situates the right to voice as a 
constitutional rule in his contribution to this Law Review: “The right to voice derives 
from the Constitution, which can be read to give criminal defendants a break when-
ever they want to present expert testimony.”  Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, supra 
note 3, at 1010 (emphasis original). 
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of Westlaw’s U.S. Supreme Court database (“SCT”)
12
 provided only 
one case that contained the phrase “right to voice,” which seems to 
have nothing to do with the right of a defendant in a criminal case to 
a voice.
13
 
Instead, I take it that Professor Slobogin is arguing that the 
Court’s prior decisions, when taken together, implicitly create such a 
right.  In both Proving the Unprovable and in this Law Review, Professor 
Slobogin cites to a variety of sources: the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Sixth Amendment’s 
compulsory process, impartial jury, and assistance of counsel claus-
es.
14
  Of course, nothing in these clauses themselves gives rise to a 
right to voice for criminal defendants.  But as Professor Slobogin cor-
rectly notes, the Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas
15
 recognized that 
the combination of these clauses could give rise to another right no-
where mentioned in the Constitution: the right of a defendant to tes-
tify. 
Because so much of Professor Slobogin’s argument in my view 
depends upon analogizing the right to voice to the right to testify, I 
think it is instructive to consider what the Court did and did not do 
in Rock.  Vickie Lorene Rock was charged with manslaughter in con-
nection with the death of her husband, apparently after a fight be-
tween the two of them.
16
  Immediately after the shooting of her hus-
band, Rock had difficulty remembering the details of the shooting, so 
at the suggestion of her attorney, she underwent hypnosis in an effort 
to refresh her memory.
17
  After these sessions, Rock “recalled” addi-
tional details of the shooting.
18
 
Prior to trial the prosecutor moved to exclude Rock’s testimony 
as a result of the hypnosis.
19
  The trial court in large part granted the 
 
 12 WESTLAW, U.S. Supreme Court Database, www.westlaw.com (search last performed 
Sept. 19, 2010). 
 13 The only case that explicitly says “right to voice” is Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 168 (1983).  In a search for “right to voice,” Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518, 570 (1819), also comes up, but as David Cramer pointed out to 
me, the actual quote in the text is “right and voice.”  Of course, it is notable that nei-
ther Connick nor Trustees of Dartmouth College is a criminal case. 
 14 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 53–55, 139; Slobogin, Mental States and Acts, supra 
note 3, at 1017. 
 15 483 U.S. 44 (1987). 
 16 Id. at 45. 
 17 Id. at 46. 
 18 Id. at 47.  Of course, it is unknowable whether Rock actually remembered these 
details because of the hypnosis or simply invented them as a result of the hypnosis. 
 19 Id.  
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motion, holding that “no hypnotically refreshed testimony would be 
admitted.”
20
  As a result the prosecutor repeatedly made objections, 
interrupting Rock’s testimony at trial and successfully arguing that 
Rock could testify only to items that she recalled to the neuropsy-
chologist prior to the hypnosis.
21
  Rock was convicted and sentenced to 
ten years; the Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently affirmed her 
conviction.
22
 
In the Supreme Court, Rock argued that the trial court’s deci-
sion to exclude her post-hypnotic recollections was unconstitutional, 
and in a 5-4 decision, the Court agreed.  Both the majority and the 
dissenters agreed that Rock had a constitutionally derived right to tes-
tify.
23
  In some ways—as the majority noted—this was a surprising 
conclusion, because at the time of the framing, defendants were for-
bidden from testifying under oath at their own trials.
24
  It is hard to 
imagine that the Framers would have thought that the Constitution 
guaranteed Rock the right to testify when, in any criminal court in 
the United States in the late eighteenth century, she would have been 
categorically forbidden from testifying. 
Two factors, though, militated in favor of finding a right to testi-
fy.  First, while it was true that, at the time of the framing of the Con-
stitution, criminal defendants had been forbidden from testifying un-
der oath, it had also long been understood at that time that the 
defendant would almost always make an unsworn statement of the 
case.
25
  This was a particularly important right because, despite the 
right to assistance of counsel found in the Sixth Amendment, it had 
long been the common law rule (changing only at the end of the 
eighteenth century) that defendants had no right to counsel in crim-
inal cases.
26
  In the absence of counsel, a defendant needed to be able 
to make a statement in order to present a defense at all.
27
  Thus, while 
the Framers would not have thought that Rock had the right to testify 
under oath to her post-hypnotic recollections, they might well have 
been surprised that she was limited in what she was allowed to tell the 
jury more generally. 
 
 20 Id. at 47. 
 21 Rock, 483 U.S. at 48 n.4. 
 22 Id. at 48. 
 23 Id. at 49; id. at 63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 24 Id. at 49.   
 25 Id. 
 26 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 
167–70 (2003).  
 27 Id. at 20–21. 
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court recognized 
that in the intervening 190 years, there had been a massive shift in 
Anglo-American law with respect to the right of a defendant to testify 
under oath.
28
  As Justice Blackmun noted, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, only one state (Georgia) forbade the defendant from 
testifying, and other common law countries reached the same result.
29
  
In other words, by recognizing a constitutional right to testify, the 
Court was simply recognizing a right that had existed by statute in 
almost all jurisdictions in the United States for almost 100 years.
30
 
What ultimately divided the Court in Rock was not the existence 
of the right to testify, but rather what sort of limitations could be 
placed upon that right.
31
  Indeed, the majority and the dissent even 
agreed that some limitations might be placed upon that right.
32
  What 
divided the majority and the dissent were differences over whether a 
state evidence rule that forbade all testimony about hypnotically in-
duced memories was too great a burden on the right to testify; the 
majority answered that question yes, the dissent no.
33
 
Of course, in finding a right to testify in the Constitution, the 
Rock Court could not simply point to the Constitution (which con-
tains no such explicit right).  Instead, the Court had to anchor the 
right to other constitutional provisions.  Justice Blackmun did just 
that, relying upon four separate constitutional provisions: the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the right to self-representation that 
arises from the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment’s Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination.
34
 
 
 28 See generally George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 662–
71 (1997). 
 29 Rock, 483 U.S. at 50.  At the same time that states had extended the right to tes-
tify to defendants, they had also abolished the right of defendants to make unsworn 
statements to the jury. 
 30 In this regard, the Court’s recognition of a right to testify in Rock is consistent 
with its tendency—noted by Michael Klarman and others—to recognize a right only 
when it has largely been accepted by society as a whole.  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 5–7 (2004).  Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero 
or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1361, 1365 (2004).  
 31 Rock, 483 U.S. at 63 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In other words, it seems 
clear that had Arkansas imposed a rule not allowing defendants in manslaughter cas-
es to testify, the Court would have struck down the provision unanimously. 
 32 Id. at 55–56 & n.11; id. at 64 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. at 61; id. at 65 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Blackmun explicitly acknowledged that some restrictions on hypnotically-
refreshed testimony would be permissible.  Id. at 61. 
 34 Id. at 51–53. 
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To make an argument for his right to voice, Professor Slobogin 
presumably assumes that the same sort of considerations that support 
the finding of the right to testify in the Constitution would support 
the finding of a right to voice.  There are several problems with this 
argument.  The biggest is the historical distinction between the right 
to voice and the right to personally address the jury (either under 
oath or by unsworn statement).  As noted above, by the time of Rock, 
almost every American jurisdiction had statutorily recognized a right 
to testify under oath for defendants for almost one hundred years.  
Professor Slobogin points to no American jurisdiction that has 
created a statutory right to voice.  Beyond this, even if we limit the 
right to voice to the particular application Professor Slobogin creates 
for it in Proving the Unprovable—a constitutional rule that allows oth-
erwise inadmissible expert evidence on behalf of a defendant on is-
sues of culpability
35
—Professor Slobogin points to no jurisdiction that 
has adopted such an approach.  Furthermore, while the trial judge’s 
actions in Rock might have surprised the Framers, given the general 
necessity for the defendant to represent himself in Anglo-American 
trials in the eighteenth century, there is little reason to think they 
would be surprised by a restriction that applied the same rules of ad-
missibility to evidence submitted by the prosecution and by the de-
fense.  Even though rules of evidence of any specificity were relatively 
new at the time of the framing, there was little reason to believe that 
those rules were generally meant to be less restrictive on the defen-
dant than on the government.
36
 
 
 35 Professor Slobogin also suggests it would permit evidence on issues of future 
dangerousness, at least for clinical prediction testimony, which he believes should 
otherwise be inadmissible.  See SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 125. 
 36 One objection raised to this point is the fact that, prior to the rise of the Right 
to Counsel in the eighteenth century, the defendant generally spoke directly to the 
jury and told his story, unrestricted by the rules of evidence (or by an oath).  
LANGBEIN, supra note 26, at 11.  But as John Langbein has shown, the rules of evi-
dence themselves did not come to play a large part in criminal litigation until coun-
sel also played a large part in criminal litigation, starting in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.  Id. at 13–15.  Thus, this prior history of unrestricted statements to 
the jury has little to teach us about the rights that exist in a world with rules of evi-
dence that limit what can be said to the jury.  Furthermore, just as the defendant had 
no right to counsel prior to the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the Crown also had 
no counsel, meaning that generally the victim represented himself.  Id. at 11.  It is 
not clear to me what restrictions, if any, were put on the “storytelling” of the victim. 
More importantly, in the ensuing 200 years since the rise of counsel in criminal 
cases (and the related decline in the making of direct statements (not under oath) to 
the jury), the rules of evidence have been generalizable, and have not recognized any 
right to voice.  That history strongly suggests to me that the Framers had no inten-
tion of creating a right to voice. 
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The particular constitutional provisions that the Rock Court and 
Professor Slobogin rely upon also provide little support either for the 
recognition of a general right to voice or the particular application of 
it Professor Slobogin seeks here.  Take first the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination.  In Rock, the majority asserted that the “guarantee 
against compelled testimony” had, as a “necessary corollary,” the op-
portunity to testify.
37
  Assuming for the moment that the right not to 
testify necessarily carries with it the right to testify, there is nothing 
about the right not to testify that necessitates a right to voice.  Of 
course, the defendant always has the option of not putting on a case 
by pleading guilty.  But no one has ever seriously suggested that the 
right not to oppose the government’s case has a necessary corollary 
that the defendant has the right to put on any case he pleases.  The 
very existence of the rules of evidence as a limitation on what may be 
admitted carries with it a rejection of this possibility. 
Furthermore, the Court itself has on other occasions rejected 
the exact same kind of “necessary corollary” 
38
 it refers to in Rock.  For 
instance, in Singer v. United States,
39
 the Court acknowledged that the 
existence of a right to a jury trial did not mean that the defendant al-
so had a right to non-jury trial.
40
  In other words, the guarantee that 
the defendant will be protected from a trial by judge does not have, 
as a necessary corollary, the guarantee that a defendant has the op-
portunity for a trial by a judge.  Professor Slobogin gives us no reason 
why the “right” to voice should be treated any differently than the 
“right” to a non-jury trial. 
The right to compulsory process is of little more help to Profes-
sor Slobogin’s argument.  In Rock, the Court recognized that the de-
fendant’s right to call witnesses must include the right of the defen-
dant to call himself to the stand to testify.
41
  But nothing in Rock 
suggests that the defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf carries 
with it the right to testify outside the scope of the usual rules of evi-
dence.  Of course, it is true that the rule applied by the trial court in 
 
 37 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. 
 38 See id. 
 39 380 U.S. 24 (1965). 
 40 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion explicitly noted that Singer was arguing for “a 
correlative right to have his case decided by a judge alone,” id. at 25–26, and then 
went on to note that “[t]he ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily 
carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right,” id. at 34–35.  As ap-
plied here, it is clear that the right not to put on a case does not mean that the de-
fendant has a correlative right to put on whatever case he wants, irrespective of the 
rules of evidence. 
 41 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–53. 
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Rock—a flat prohibition on hypnotically-refreshed testimony—was 
characterized by the Arkansas courts as a general rule of evidence in 
Arkansas, and Rock was seeking an exception to that general rule (an 
exception the Supreme Court granted).  But at the same time, the 
Court explicitly noted and reaffirmed that the general rules of pro-
cedure and evidence in no way offend the defendant’s right to testi-
fy,
42
 and it further reserved judgment on whether the general prohi-
bition on hypnotically-refreshed testimony was constitutional.
43
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Holmes v. South Caroli-
na
44
 provides further reason to believe that there is no right to voice.  
In Holmes, the defendant sought to put on evidence of the guilt of a 
third-party for the crimes with which the defendant was charged.
45
  
The trial court refused the evidence on the ground that there was 
“forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly support[ed] a guilty ver-
dict.”
46
  Justice Alito, in holding for the defendant, noted that states 
have broad authority to create evidence rules that exclude evidence 
in criminal cases.
47
  He noted, though (while quoting from Rock), that 
such rules will infringe the defendant’s opportunity to present a de-
fense when they “infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and 
are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to 
serve.”
48
  He characterized Rock as an example of this general prin-
ciple, because it had involved the “wholesale inadmissibility of a de-
fendant’s testimony . . . in the absence of clear evidence by the State 
repudiating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections.”
49
  Justice 
Alito then went on to clarify: 
While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense 
evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are 
disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, 
well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude 
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other fac-
tors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential 
to mislead the jury. Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have 
stated that the Constitution permits judges “to exclude evidence 
 
 42 Id. at 55 n.11. 
 43 Id. at 58 n.15. 
 44 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
 45 Id. at 323. 
 46 Id. at 321. 
 47 Id. at 324. 
 48 Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 
 49 Id. at 326 (quotation marks omitted). 
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that is ‘repetitive . . . , only marginally relevant’ or poses an undue 
risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’
50
 
The question for the right to voice, therefore, is whether the 
unwillingness of states to recognize such a right either serves no legi-
timate purpose or is disproportionate to the ends that the refusal 
seeks to promote.  The answer is no on all counts.  Allowing a defen-
dant an open opportunity to present whatever evidence he wishes 
under the rubric of a right to voice would obviously run contrary to 
the desire for orderly trials in which one of the most important, if not 
the most important, goals is achieving an accurate outcome.  After 
all, what a right to voice seeks to do—under Professor Slobogin’s de-
scription—is to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence: evidence that 
I believe, if admitted, would frustrate the goals of an accurate and or-
derly outcome.  As Justice Alito recognizes in Holmes, such goals are 
clearly permitted.
51
 
The same reasoning clearly applies to the narrow application of 
the right to voice Professor Slobogin seeks to implement in Proving 
the Unprovable: the right to present otherwise inadmissible expert evi-
dence on the defendant’s culpability.  The rule serves a legitimate 
purpose: it seeks to keep evidence from the jury that cannot meet the 
widely applied requirements for the admission of expert evidence.  
The state would seemingly have a very legitimate purpose in ensuring 
that the same standards of reliability are applied across-the-board to 
all kinds of evidence introduced at a criminal trial.
52
 
Of course, Professor Slobogin might seek to assert that the rule 
is disproportionate to the end it seeks to serve.  Indeed, I take it that 
he reads United States v. Scheffer
53
 in precisely this manner.
54
  Scheffer in-
volved the admissibility of polygraph evidence in criminal cases.
55
  Jus-
tice Thomas, writing for the Court, found that the Constitution did 
not require the admissibility of such evidence.
56
  Described this way, 
Scheffer seems to be a case that strongly argues against Professor Slo-
bogin’s position. 
 
 50 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326–27 (citations omitted). 
 51 Id. at 326–27. 
 52 Again, I am not suggesting that the state ought to exclude such evidence, just 
that a decision to exclude such evidence would be supported by a legitimate pur-
pose, even if it is one that might be outweighed by other concerns. 
 53 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 54 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 55 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305. 
 56 Id. 
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Professor Slobogin, though, suggests three reasons to read Schef-
fer as finding a right to voice.  First, one of Justice Thomas’s justifica-
tions for his decision was that jurors viewed polygraph evidence as 
nearly infallible, such that they would defer to the polygraph expert 
and fail to make their own determination about the veracity of the 
defendant’s statement.
57
  Professor Slobogin argues that in the case of 
expert evidence about culpability, we need not worry about such 
over-reliance.
58
  Second, according to Professor Slobogin, Justice 
Thomas’s worry in Scheffer was that expert evidence about polygraph 
examinations did not bring additional facts to the jury but instead on-
ly served to replace the jury’s role in determining the credibility of 
witnesses.
59
  Because culpability experts are not testifying to credibili-
ty, they do not pose the same concern.
60
  Finally, Justice Thomas 
noted the prohibition in Scheffer, unlike that in Rock, did not prevent 
the defendant from telling his story.
61
  According to Professor Slobo-
gin, expert evidence about culpability is more like the defendant’s 
testimony in Rock than it is like the polygraph expert in Scheffer and, 
therefore, does prohibit “the defendant from giving his own version 
of events in his own words.”
62
 
Not one of these arguments holds water.  First, Professor Slobo-
gin overstates the importance of the over-reliance argument in Schef-
fer.  On this point, a majority of the Court did not join Justice Tho-
mas. Indeed, four justices in the majority and the dissenting justice 
specifically did not agree with Justice Thomas.
63
  Because over-
reliance on polygraph evidence was not a concern to a majority of the 
justices in Scheffer, it is a bit odd to assume that a distinction on this 
front would make any doctrinal difference. 
Second, the distinction between extrinsic facts (or what my col-
league Michael Risinger refers to as brute facts of guilt and inno-
cence) and issues of credibility actually cuts against Professor Slobo-
gin’s argument.
64
  After all, the expert evidence Professor Slobogin 
seeks to introduce is about the mental state of the defendant.  Just as 
 
 57 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313.  
 60 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 54–55. 
 61 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 317. 
 62 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 55 (quotation marks omitted). 
 63 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318–19 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part); id. at 336–38 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 64 As with the argument about over-reliance, a majority of the Court did not join 
this part of Justice Thomas’s opinion. See id. at 312–15. 
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with evidence of credibility, the testimony of mental health profes-
sionals that Professor Slobogin seeks to introduce at trial “can supply 
the jury only with another opinion, in addition to its own, about 
whether the” defendant had the requisite mental state.
65
  In other 
words, testimony about culpability seems a lot more like testimony 
about credibility than like testimony about “the analysis of finger-
prints, ballistics, or DNA found at a crime scene.”
66
  On this factor as 
well, it seems clear that Scheffer supports exclusion, not admission. 
Finally, Professor Slobogin’s assertion that the prohibition on 
expert testimony stops the defendant from giving his story is simply 
wrong—the defendant is always available to testify.  Indeed, it seems 
somewhat incongruous to suggest that a mental health expert may be 
the only source of information about the defendant’s past mental 
states.  Professor Slobogin, I believe, would respond that the defen-
dant himself often does not know what his mental state was at the 
time of the offense: that not only might there be no objective truth 
about such states but that, even if there were such an objective truth, 
the defendant would have a hard time describing the complexity of 
his actual mental state in testimony.
67
  Thus, a mental health expert is 
necessary to present this information to the jury, or the defendant 
will never be able to tell his story about his mental state.  The prob-
lem here is that, in truth, almost all evidence is contingent in some 
sense, and it is necessary to draw inferences with all evidence in order 
to point to the defendant’s guilt (or innocence).  The “fact” of a 
match between one fingerprint and another requires some form of 
inference and interpretation about which similarities matter and 
which do not, and to testify to this, the expert must satisfy the Daubert 
criteria (or whatever other test the particular jurisdiction uses).  I do 
not take it that Professor Slobogin would suggest that the right to 
voice goes so far as to require the admission of an unqualified expert 
merely so that the defendant can have his story heard on this point: 
the defendant’s testimony, along with his lawyer’s arguments in clos-
ing, are deemed a sufficient protection.  Professor Slobogin gives us 
no reason to believe a generalized exception—the right to voice—is 
necessary.
68
 
 
 65 Id. at 313. 
 66 Id.  
 67 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 43–44 (citing Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Ap-
proach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1998)); see also 
Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 10, 1651. 
 68 In his reply to this Essay, Professor Slobogin suggests that the testimony of 
mental health experts is uniquely necessary because they are “needed so that the dis-
parate aspects of an explanation for criminal behavior . . . can be woven together in-
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Indeed, in a part of the opinion joined by seven other members 
of the Court, Justice Thomas distinguished Scheffer from Rock, noting 
that Rock involved a case where the jury had been deprived “of the 
testimony of the only witness who was at the scene and had firsthand 
knowledge of the facts.”
69
  Thus, when expert evidence about mental 
states is excluded, much like when polygraph evidence is excluded, 
the jury still “hear[s] all the relevant details of the charged offense 
from the perspective of the accused, and the [exclusion does] not 
preclude him from introducing any factual evidence”—at least as the 
Court defined that term in Scheffer.
70
  Stated simply, it is implausible to 
read Scheffer as supporting the right to voice. 
Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the right to self-
representation found by the Court in Faretta v. California
71
 supports a 
right to voice.  In Rock, the Court noted that “an accused’s right to 
present his own version of events in his own words” was “[e]ven more 
fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-
 
to a plausible whole” and because the “goal of the experts in these cases is to explain 
behavior, not simply verify the usually meager, meandering account of past mental 
state the defendant is able to give.”  Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 
10, 1651, 1652.  Here, I believe that Professor Slobogin could be making one or both 
of two points.  First, he might be suggesting that mental health experts are uniquely 
necessary because they are the only ones who can take various brute facts—”the de-
fendant’s own statements, third party statements, psychiatric records, psychological 
tests”—and make a compelling argument to the jury about the defendant’s mental 
state.  If this is his argument, my response is that this is what lawyers do for their 
clients all the time: they take seeming unrelated brute facts and weave them into a 
story about why certain inferences should or should not be made.  (Furthermore, if 
this is his argument, it seems to run afoul of precisely the “bolstering” limitation in 
Scheffer.)  In my view, Professor Slobogin still fails to demonstrate why mental health 
experts who are otherwise unqualified to testify are so uniquely situated to make ar-
guments about the defendant’s mental state that we should, as a constitutional matter, 
require such testimony to be admitted.  Again, it may well be that courts and legisla-
tures should, as a matter of policy, admit such explanatory evidence (as they do in 
other contexts); but that is a different issue than what is constitutionally required. 
Second, Professor Slobogin might also be arguing that mental health experts are 
bringing otherwise unavailable information to the jury, in the form of scientific in-
formation about the defendant’s mental state.  My reply here is in the same vein: if 
the “scientific” evidence otherwise does not meet the existing standards for admissi-
bility, I simply do not think the existing law supports admission under the Constitu-
tion.  As noted above, the state would seemingly have a legitimate purpose in exclud-
ing such evidence.  Of course, Professor Slobogin thinks (and I might agree) that 
there is a more important purpose served by admitting such evidence.  But what the 
Supreme Court has required is that the government have no legitimate purpose in 
seeking exclusion, and here I fail to see how we can characterize the government’s 
position as lacking any legitimate purpose. 
 69 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315. 
 70 Id. at 317; see also id. at 317 n.13. 
 71 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 
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representation.”
72
  Assuming for these purposes that Justice Black-
mun’s observation is true, it does nothing for the creation of a right 
to voice.  After all, as noted in the previous paragraph, a right to 
voice, when conceived as a right to put on otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence, does not further the goal of allowing the defendant to present 
events “in his own words.”
73
  Instead, what the defendant is being de-
nied is the words of others.  Although there might be normative reasons 
to want the defendant to be able to present the words of others—a 
topic taken up in the next Part—the right to self-representation can-
not be taken to provide doctrinal support for such a right. 
Finally, the Due Process Right discussed in Rock does not supply 
doctrinal support for Professor Slobogin’s proposed right.  Justice 
Blackmun stated in Rock that “[t]he necessary ingredients of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
liberty without due process of law include a right to be heard and to 
offer testimony.”
74
  Justice Blackmun then pointed to two instances in 
which the Court had previously noted the importance of a defendant 
testifying on his own behalf: In re Oliver
75
 and Ferguson v. Georgia.
76
  
Professor Slobogin, though, nowhere suggests that the Court has si-
milarly suggested that it is a necessary ingredient of due process that 
the defendant be able to present otherwise inadmissible evidence so 
that he can “tell his story.”  Indeed, given what the Court has said on 
other occasions, such a statement would be somewhat startling.  Jus-
tice Alito in Holmes noted that “well-established rules of evidence 
permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is out-
weighed by certain other factors.”
77
  The Court in Scheffer agreed that 
the application of the expert evidence rules in that case was “a ra-
tional and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in 
barring unreliable evidence.”
78
  There is simply nothing in the 
Court’s Due Process jurisprudence that suggests the existence of the 
right to voice. 
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST THE RIGHT TO VOICE 
Simply because the case law does not currently support the exis-
tence of a right to voice does not necessarily mean that such a right 
 
 72 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. 
 73 See id.  
 74 Id. at 51. 
 75 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
 76 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
 77 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006). 
 78 523 U.S. 311, 312 (1998). 
LILLQUIST FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  4:07 PM 
2010] THE RIGHT TO VOICE? 1635 
should not be created.  Professor Slobogin could be understood to be 
making a normative rather than a descriptive argument: that given 
the competing concerns at issue, courts should create a right for de-
fendants to present any evidence they choose to tell their stories so 
long as the evidence is not so “completely untrustworthy or so im-
mune to the weapons of the adversarial process that its questionable 
nature is not likely to be exposed.”
79
  I believe there are good reasons 
to reject a normative argument for such a right. 
The effect of such a constitutional rule, I take it, is that it over-
rules non-constitutional rules of exclusion of evidence proffered by 
the defendant (except under the conditions noted above).  Putting 
aside for the moment the particular case Professor Slobogin is dis-
cussing—the admission of defense-proffered culpability and dange-
rousness evidence—this articulation of the right to voice would seem 
to overrule some standard rules of evidence and admit evidence that 
is routinely excluded.  One example is hearsay evidence.  Imagine, 
for instance, that a defendant is charged with murder.  The defen-
dant wants his cousin, Matthews, to testify that Matthews’s cellmate, 
Smith, told Matthews that Jones had confessed to the murder in a 
previous conversation with Smith.  Assume Smith has since died and 
Jones invokes his privilege against self-incrimination.  Under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, Matthews may not testify to Smith’s recollec-
tion of Jones’s statements: the evidence is hearsay, and no available 
exception applies.
80
  Under Professor Slobogin’s right to voice—at 
least as I have conceptualized it above—the evidence may nonethe-
less be admissible.  Assuming that the defendant’s defense is that “I 
did not do it; Jones did it,” evidence that Jones confessed to the mur-
der would seem to be part of the defendant’s story.  Furthermore, it 
seems that to the extent that the evidence is suspect—there is good 
reason to think that the defendant is simply taking advantage of the 
fact that Smith died to induce the defendant’s cousin, Matthews, to 
 
 79 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 61.  In his discussion on the right to voice, Professor Slo-
bogin, in Proving the Unprovable, seems to be primarily making a doctrinal argument, 
asserting that such a right does exist under Supreme Court precedent.  See SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 2, at 53–55.  In his prior contribution to this law review, however, he af-
firmatively states that he is making a normative argument.  See Slobogin, Mental States 
and Acts, supra note 3, at 1016–18. 
 80 In fact, the testimony is classic “double hearsay,” at least at common law: 
Jones’s confession to Smith and Smith’s statement to Matthews fit the definition of 
hearsay in Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  None of the exceptions 
found in Rule 803 fit the situation.  Furthermore, while Smith is unavailable within 
the meaning of Rule 804(a)(4), his statement to Matthews does not fit any of the 
available exceptions: in particular, it is not a statement against Smith’s interest.  FED. 
R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
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make-up the conversation between Mathews and Smith—the suspi-
cion can be laid out in the form of vigorous cross-examination of 
Matthews.
81
 
Professor Slobogin’s right to voice appears to be a call for “free 
proof” or at least free proof for the defendant’s “story”: any evidence 
should be admitted, so long as it is neither untrustworthy nor im-
mune to adversarial testing.  The general merits of a system of free 
proof, as opposed to the more limited system of admissibility adopted 
in modern common law systems, are beyond the scope of this short 
Essay.  Even if Professor Slobogin believes we should move to such a 
general system, he gives no defense of that position in either his book 
or his Essay.  Instead, he seems to limit such a system only to evidence 
in support of the defendant’s story. 
The true normative question, therefore, is whether it would be 
good policy to liberalize the admissibility of evidence for the defen-
dant in criminal cases while requiring the government to abide by the 
“traditional” rules of evidence.  In other words, should the scales of 
admissibility be tipped in the defendant’s favor?  The answer is no. 
The primary aim of the law of evidence and procedure is to 
reach accurate outcomes.
82
  In a world of no constraints—economic, 
behavioral or temporal—the best way to reach accurate outcomes 
would be to collect all the possible information and then sort 
through it.  The modern American law of criminal evidence and pro-
 
 81 Another interesting question posed by the right to voice is whether it would 
provide a check on heretofore constitutionally permitted rules of exclusion for dis-
covery failures by the defendant.  For instance, in Taylor v. Illinois, the Supreme 
Court allowed the trial court in Illinois to exclude evidence of Taylor’s alibi in the 
wake of the failure of his attorney to give proper notice of the evidence to the prose-
cution.  484 U.S. 400, 402 (1988).  The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of 
such evidence was permissible under the Compulsory Process Clause.  Id. Because 
the rule of exclusion of the defendant’s testimony was not constitutionally mandated 
but merely constitutionally permitted, one could easily ask whether such a rule would 
violate the right to voice.  To the extent that the trial court’s exclusion of the alibi 
evidence did not allow the defendant to tell his story, it would seem that the right was 
violated.  Furthermore, because the evidence was excluded only on the ground that 
it was untimely under the law of discovery in the state of Illinois, id. at 433–34, it 
would appear that the evidence was neither completely untrustworthy nor immune 
to meaningful adversarial testing.   
 82 Professor Slobogin suggests in his reply that I insinuate that accuracy is the on-
ly goal of the criminal justice system.  Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 
10, at 1657.  Not so.  As my use of the word primary suggests, I do think accuracy is 
the most important goal of the law of evidence and procedure.  No one could se-
riously study either the rules of evidence or criminal procedure and think that accu-
racy is the only goal.  I do, however, think it is fair to say that Professor Slobogin and I 
part ways on how often such alternative goals ought to displace the role of accuracy, 
and I am happy to come down strongly in favor of accuracy. 
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cedure, however, is not designed to collect all possible information 
and instead is a hodgepodge of rules and exceptions.  There are 
good reasons for this.  We live in a world of limitations: there are real 
economic and time constraints on our ability to collect information, 
and there are real constraints on the abilities of human beings as de-
cision makers to process all the information.  The crucial question 
then, for any real-world system of evidence and procedure, is whether 
a change in that system will improve or impair the ability of the sys-
tem to achieve accurate outcomes. 
Liberalizing the ability of defendants to tell “their story”—at 
least against the background of modern American law—is unlikely to 
lead to more accurate outcomes.  Any change in the rules of evidence 
and procedure will generally affect the mix of accurate and inaccu-
rate verdicts (both guilty and not guilty verdicts) in the criminal jus-
tice system.
83
  A change in the rules of evidence or procedure will im-
prove the accuracy of the criminal justice system when the change 
improves the epistemic functioning of the overall system.  As I have 
explained elsewhere, there are some rule changes that almost certain-
ly fall into this category. 
84
  For instance, requiring that the govern-
ment tape record interrogations of suspects will likely make the re-
sults of such interrogations on the whole more accurate.
85
  The net 
result should be both fewer false convictions and fewer false acquit-
tals. 
Other changes to the rules of evidence and procedure, though, 
are not improvements to the epistemic functioning of the system and 
instead simply have the effect of trading one form of erroneous ver-
dict for another form of erroneous verdict.  Change to the standard 
of proof in criminal cases is the classic example of this: increasing the 
amount of evidence that the government needs to prove the defen-
dant guilty of the crime simply shifts errors—it is a change that de-
creases erroneous guilty verdicts but, at the same time, increases the 
number of erroneous not guilty verdicts.  Indeed, given some stan-
dard assumptions about the make-up of the persons subject to the 
 
 83 I use the term verdicts here, but of course what really matters is not so much 
the verdicts reached at trial but the overall accuracy of outcomes achieved by the sys-
tem: how many guilty defendants are ultimately convicted (be it by guilty verdict or 
guilty plea) and how many innocent defendants are ultimately released (be it by ac-
quittal or by dismissal of charges).  Another question, of course, is whether and how 
to count guilty defendants who are never charged, but I will place that issue outside 
the bounds of my discussion in this Essay. 
 84 Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897, 923–
26 (2007). 
 85 Id.  
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criminal justice system, I have shown elsewhere that it is quite likely 
that such a change generally decreases the overall accuracy of the 
criminal justice system rather dramatically.
86
 
The key question, then, with the right to voice is which example 
it is more like: is it something that would improve the overall epistem-
ic functioning of the system, like a requirement of taping, or does it 
just make it harder for the government to prove its case, like raising 
the standard of proof?  Another way to view the question is this: 
would the right to voice help all defendants equally, or would it be 
likely to help innocent defendants more than it does guilty defen-
dants?
87
 
One key reason to suspect that the right to voice would not en-
hance the epistemic functioning of the system is that it would only 
admit evidence that was otherwise inadmissible under the usual rules 
of evidence.  Professor Slobogin himself seems to acknowledge this 
when he states that the right to voice is a principle that is being used 
to overcome a general commitment to scientific validity.  If we as-
sume that scientific validity is a commitment because it increases ac-
curacy, it appears at least implicit in Professor Slobogin’s argument 
that the right to voice is not accuracy-enhancing.
88
 
Of course, it is possible that the right to voice is accuracy-
enhancing after all.  For instance, Professor Slobogin’s description of 
the right to voice as enabling the defendant to tell his story has 
echoes in the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief v. United States.
89
  
In that case, the government had sought and won the admission of 
the full record of the defendant’s prior convictions in a case in which 
the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a wea-
pon.
90
  Although the Court found that the full record should not have 
 
 86 Erik Lillquist, Balancing Errors in the Criminal Justice System, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
175, 175–77 (2008). 
 87 As Fred Schauer reminded me, the mere fact that the number of accurate con-
victions is reduced does not mean that the right to voice is a bad idea.  After all, the 
decrease in the number of inaccurate convictions (and increase number of accurate 
acquittals) could be a benefit that outweighs that cost.  See generally Erik Lillquist, Re-
casting Reasonable Doubt: The Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002).  
This, though, would require us to believe that the system as it presently stands is pre-
sently balanced to convict too many innocent defendants.  Perhaps.  But I think 
there is just as good reason to believe that the system convicts too few guilty defen-
dants, and, in any event, Professor Slobogin nowhere (to my knowledge) suggests 
that the general problem with the criminal justice system is that it is too balanced in 
favor of conviction. 
 88 See SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 53. 
 89 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 90 Id. at 177. 
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been admitted and that instead the defendant should have been al-
lowed to stipulate to the prior conviction element of the “felon-in-
possession” offense, the Supreme Court recognized that the evidence 
was relevant and that the government generally had an interest in 
telling its “story”—“the prosecution with its burden of persuasion 
needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story.” 
91
  Justice Souter’s 
opinion for the Court seemed to recognize that a piece of evidence 
might have more probative value for the decision maker than we 
might believe in the abstract because it adds to the narrative richness 
of the trial.
92
  In a case where the defense offers to stipulate to certain 
points, often the government will be allowed to put on alternative 
evidence because the ultimate decision makers—usually the jury—
will be better able to process the totality of the information when it is 
presented in the form of a complete narrative, rather than as a set of 
disconnected abstract stipulations combined with snippets of testi-
monial and documentary evidence. 
As applied to the right to voice, Old Chief can be understood to 
support the idea that the defendant needs to be able to present the 
evidence of others to tell his story.  At the level of the general right, I 
believe the answer to be clearly no.  Recall from the last section the 
right to testify arising out of Rock.  In light of the Court’s decision in 
that case, it is fair to say—and I think Professor Slobogin would 
agree—that the defendant himself generally has the right to testify on 
most matters, subject of course to the other rules of evidence.  In 
other words, the defendant will generally be able to present almost 
any facts he has observed that are in any way relevant to the matter at 
hand.
93
 
 
 91 Id. at 190. 
 92 Id. at 188–89.  
 93 One possible objection at this stage to my argument—initially made to me by 
Michael Risinger—is this: while it is true that defendants might present such evidence 
on their own behalf, many do not, in large part because, if they do, they open up the 
possibility of admitting evidence of their past crimes under Federal Rule of Evidence 
609.  So while the defendant may have this right in theory, in practice he often does 
not, because he will be unwilling to testify and allow in evidence of his prior mis-
deeds.  The right to voice, then, might be a way for defendants to effectuate the 
promise of the right to testify in a way that does not expose them to otherwise ad-
missible evidence. 
While such an argument is plausible, I give it little weight.  First, Professor Slo-
bogin himself does not mention it as a justification for the right to voice, and has 
now specifically rejected it.  See Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 10, at 
1650 n.18.  Second, in many contexts it is probable that the defendants’ past bad acts 
are likely also to come to light as part of the evidence.  In Professor Slobogin’s par-
ticular applications—evidence of culpability and evidence of future dangerousness—
the mental health professional may be required to testify to the information upon 
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As conceptualized by Professor Slobogin, the right to voice al-
lows for the admission of the testimony of others, even though that 
testimony violates other rules of evidence.  But given that the defen-
dant himself is already permitted to give a tale of narrative richness to 
the jury, it is hard to see how allowing others to engage in such “story 
telling”
94
 would add narrative richness in any significant sense.  It is 
hard to see how, in general terms, allowing the defendant to bypass 
the limitations of the rules of evidence and procedure would general-
ly improve the accuracy of the system. 
Consider again the example I gave above: the defendant’s prof-
fer of the testimony of Matthews that Smith (now deceased) told Mat-
thews that Jones confessed to committing a murder to Smith.  As I 
noted, the law of evidence would generally forbid this testimony.  
Why?  Because there are many reasons to be suspicious of both the 
alleged conversations between Smith and Jones and between Smith 
and Matthews.  As I suggested above, though, under a right to voice, 
such evidence might be admissible because Matthews testimony could 
be subject to adversarial testing: the prosecutor could point out both 
that Matthews really has no idea what Jones told Smith and that Mat-
thews might be lying or misunderstood what Smith was telling Mat-
thews.  But such a result, I posit, would generally decrease accuracy 
(or at least not increase accuracy).
95
  After all, admission of the evi-
dence can only help increase the chances that the defendant will be 
acquitted.  Otherwise, why would the defendant offer the evidence?  
Given the ease with which such evidence can be fabricated, there is 
no particular reason to think that innocent defendants would be 
more aided by this adjustment in the rules of admissibility than guilty 
defendants.
96
  Assuming that there are more guilty than innocent de-
fendants who go to trial, this would mean that more guilty defendants 
would in fact be able to take advantage of the rule than innocent de-
fendants, which translates into more, not less, false verdicts.
97
 
 
which she based her opinion by the other party (here, the government).  See FED. R. 
EVID. 703.  As part of this process, it seems quite likely that the defendants’ other 
crimes will come up, so such evidence seems to pose much the same problem that 
the defendant’s own testimony would. 
 94 I intend the use of the phrase “story telling” here to be non-pejorative. 
 95 Professor Slobogin suggests that I am unjustified in assuming that the cousin’s 
testimony will lead to inaccuracy.  See Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 
10, at 1660.  Of course, in some cases allowing the cousin’s testimony will result in 
more accurate verdicts.  My point is just that, on average, such testimony will under-
mine accuracy, not enhance it. 
 96 Or, more precisely, that they would be significantly more aided. 
 97 Dale Nance suggested to me that one complication with this example is that it 
represents a present asymmetry between the government and the defendant, because 
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Thus, while allowing defendants to tell their story through the 
testimony of others might increase the narrative richness of the trial, 
when this idea is used to expand the defendant’s right to present evi-
dence, it seems ripe to be exploited to decrease the accuracy of ver-
dicts in criminal cases.  Furthermore, such an approach would radi-
cally expand the views of Justice Souter in Old Chief.  After all, in that 
case, the argument for narrative richness was simply that the interest 
in such richness would often—but not always—overcome the objec-
tion by the defendant that there was an alternative and less prejudi-
cial way of presenting the evidence.
98
  Justice Souter did not suggest, 
however, that the interest in narrative richness would make a piece of 
evidence that was otherwise inadmissible suddenly admissible. 
Despite my general objection to the right to voice, I take no po-
sition here, as a normative matter, on the particular issue that Profes-
sor Slobogin discusses: whether evidence about culpability and dan-
gerousness should be subject to the same admissibility constraints as 
other forms of evidence.
99
  I also do not reject out-of-hand Professor 
 
the government, if it favored the testimony, could always grant Jones use immunity, 
which would overcome his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
While Professor Nance is right about this, the further nuance is that even if the gov-
ernment granted use immunity to Jones, Jones will almost assuredly deny the killing.  
As a result, the best that the defendant will be able to do is ask Jones whether he told 
Smith that Jones had killed the victim, which again Jones will presumably deny.  
Since Smith is unavailable to provide extrinsic evidence of the statement, there will 
be no evidence that Jones made the statement. 
 98 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 169, 189 (1997). 
 99 In Part II of his response, Professor Slobogin suggests that I am unduly con-
cerned about the accuracy-defeating aspects of the right to voice as applied to de-
fense mental health expert testimony.  Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 
10, at 1654–55.  He then forcefully argues that such evidence is “unlikely to cause er-
roneous verdicts.”  Id. at 1655.  Let me be clear: I do not have a firm view whether 
such evidence will enhance or detract from accuracy.  Thus, as a policy matter, I re-
main at least agnostic about the admission of such evidence.  However, what I do 
maintain is that a generalized right to voice will generally undermine accuracy and 
that as a result a generalized right to voice is a bad idea.   
Additionally and more specifically, the accuracy-enhancing effects of the admis-
sion of defense mental health expert testimony are sufficiently questionable that a 
state would have a legitimate purpose under existing law in excluding such evidence, 
such that the refusal to admit it does not violate the Constitution.  As Professor Slo-
bogin notes, the Court’s decision in Arizona v. Clark, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), suggests 
that the Supreme Court agrees that, at a minimum, it is not clear that such evidence 
is accuracy enhancing.  Of course, as he also rightfully points out, the Court’s deci-
sion in Clark is almost hopelessly confused, and I am in general agreement with him 
that the Court’s rationale for upholding the exclusion of (otherwise admissible) 
mental health evidence as to mens rea does not hold water.  See Slobogin, The Right to 
Voice Reprised, supra note 10, at 1653–54.  Against this background, though, I continue 
to believe that there is, at present, no good argument to believe that otherwise inad-
missible defense mental health testimony is constitutionally required to be admitted. 
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Slobogin’s claim that the defendant’s interest in telling his story may, 
in some cases, necessitate allowing such evidence because the defen-
dant otherwise has no way of telling a story with narrative richness.  
What I do reject is the concept that, as a normative matter, the de-
fendant has some generalized right to voice that voids all rules of evi-
dence and procedure unless the evidence “is completely untrustwor-
thy or so immune to the weapons of the adversarial process that its 
questionable nature is not likely to be exposed.”
100
 
There is one alternative way that the right to voice might be jus-
tified, as a normative matter.  In Proving the Unprovable, Professor Slo-
bogin also appeals for “flexible evidentiary standards”
101
 for expert 
evidence so that the system will appear fair.  Although Professor Slo-
bogin himself restricts this argument to the particular case of defense 
evidence, it is plausible to extend it to the right to voice in general.  
That is, one might argue that the defendant has a right to voice not 
because it increases accuracy in any way but because a right to voice is 
necessary so that the system will appear fair or legitimate. 
Again, here I do not quibble with Professor Slobogin’s assertion 
that the admission of defense mental health expert evidence is neces-
sary for the appearance of fairness: I leave that for each reader to de-
cide.  I do, however, reject any suggestion that a generalized right to 
voice is necessary for the appearance of fairness.  Creating additional 
rights of admissibility of evidence for the defendant certainly will give 
the public the impression that the trial process favors the defendant.  
But it does not follow that society will believe that the result is a more 
fair or more legitimate system.  To the contrary, I am inclined to 
think that the criminal justice system’s legitimacy and fairness are 
more likely to be undermined by rules that are more pro-defendant 
than those rules that favor the government. 
Similarly, I reject Professor Slobogin’s arguments in his response 
to this Essay that there are good moral reasons to recognize a right to 
voice.
102
  First, while we both admire my colleague Alice Ristroph’s ar-
gument about the applicability of the work of Thomas Hobbes to 
modern criminal law and procedure, I believe he stretches Professor 
Ristroph’s argument too far.  As she notes, the right to resist, in the 
thinking of Hobbes, was a blameless liberty, not a “legally enforceable 
claim.”
103
  In her Essay, Professor Ristroph suggests that two legally en-
forceable rights of defendants—the privilege against self-
 
 100 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). 
 101 SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 55. 
 102 See Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 10, at 1660–62.   
 103 Id. at 618; see also id. at 628. 
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incrimination and the right to speak in one’s own defense—might be 
understood as forms of resistance that society has legitimized.
104
  But 
as Professor Ristroph acknowledges, these rights are both more and 
less potent than Hobbes’ own conception of the right to resist: “less 
potent, because they do not permit actual violent resistance . . . more 
potent, because they are [legally] enforceable.”
105
  Obviously, not all 
forms of non-violent resistance would be legitimized and made legally 
enforceable on this account.
106
  Professor Ristroph nowhere suggests, 
nor do I believe that Professor Slobogin thinks that the right to resist 
would allow a defendant to put on whatever evidence he wanted, in-
cluding evidence that would suggest that the jury should nullify the 
law.  So the question would be how to decide which procedural rights 
on this account are morally required by the greater right to resist.  
Professor Ristroph in her short Essay, which is not in any event pri-
marily concerned with evidentiary and criminal procedure rights, 
does not attempt to provide such a framework, and, to my reading, 
neither does Professor Slobogin.  Given, however, the lengthy pedi-
gree of allowing defendants to speak on their behalf and to resist self-
incrimination, compared to the complete failure of any court or legis-
lature to acknowledge the existence of a right to voice, I remain high-
ly skeptical that the right to voice could be made a moral require-
ment on a Hobbesian or even neo-Hobbesian approach. 
Second, I believe Professor Slobogin also overreaches in his 
reading of Todd Pettys’s article.
107
  First, one might wonder how 
strong the moral claim that Professor Pettys has identified—honoring 
jurors’ deliberative autonomy through a complete body of relevant 
evidence—really is, given, as he acknowledges, “that modern courts 
and commentators have not even contemplated the possibility that 
such a moral claim might exist.”
108
  But even if we temporarily accept 
 
 104 Id. at 629–30.   
 105 Id. at 630.   
 106 It is not even clear to me that Professor Ristroph is correct in asserting that So-
crates would have been privileged to escape from his execution with Crito, even if 
that escape involved no violence.  Id. at 628.  An interesting counter-example from 
the actual behavior of the founding generation is that of Henry Laurens, the Con-
gressionally-appointed minister to Holland who was captured by the British en route 
to Holland in 1780.  Even though Laurens was held for treason and not as a prisoner 
of war, he declined the opportunity to escape, asserting that it was inconsistent with 
his moral duties.  See JACK RAKOVE, REVOLUTIONARIES 242–43 (2010).  I am therefore 
not convinced that it is clear that one has a moral privilege to escape from punish-
ment under any circumstances. 
 107 Todd E. Pettys, The Immoral Application of Exclusionary Rules, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 
463 (2008). 
 108 Id. at 468.   
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the existence of such a moral obligation, it is far from clear that it 
would require a right to voice.  As Professor Slobogin notes, Professor 
Pettys’s approach would seem to advocate the wholesale destruction 
of the hearsay rules, and that would also mean doing away with the 
Supreme Court’s present interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause.
109
  But so long as we are stuck with both the Confrontation 
Clause and the hearsay rules, it is difficult to see how a defendant’s 
right to voice can be an adequate substitute for the recognition of a 
juror’s right to evidence. 
Furthermore, when we look at the specific application of the 
right to voice in which Professor Slobogin is interested in Proving the 
Unprovable—admitting defense mental health evidence—the jurors’ 
right to evidence would not seem to support the admission of such 
evidence.  Professor Pettys’s primary focus is on rules that are pre-
mised on distrust of jurors’ rational capacities.
110
  But I do not believe 
that the resistance to defense mental health expert testimony is pre-
mised on the notion that we do not trust jurors to make rational deci-
sions nor that the failure to recognize one suggests that “we [are] 
withhold[ing] some of the readily available informational tools that 
an autonomous, rational person would use to do the job.”
111
  While 
certainly the strictures of the Daubert trilogy evolve from a concern 
that jurors will be unable to evaluate competing expertise at trial, the 
concern is of a different sort than the concern that underlies our ex-
clusion of hearsay, character evidence, and unfairly prejudicial evi-
dence.  The primary concern with such evidence is that jurors are 
simply irrational: they are incapable of evaluating the evidence in a 
rational manner and are likely to ignore the rational limitations of 
the evidence.
112
  The Daubert trilogy, however, is aimed at a slightly 
different concern: the idea that some evidence should be shielded 
from the jury because it is simply beyond the reasoning power of 
people generally, in the limited context of a trial, to fully inform 
themselves of all of the limitations of the evidence.  In other words, 
the driving force behind Daubert is not that jurors cannot rationally 
comprehend the limitations of the evidence, but rather that in the 
time frame of a trial, they cannot be sufficiently educated in a timely 
 
 109 Slobogin, The Right to Voice Reprised, supra note 10, at 1660–61.  As to the Con-
frontation Clause, I suspect that Professor Slobogin and I are on the same page.  
 110 Pettys, supra note 107, at 469.   
 111 Id. at 492.   
 112 Id. at 497–98.   
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fashion to do so.
113
  If I am right that Daubert can be understood this 
way, then it differs in kind from the rules that Professor Pettys is criti-
quing, because it is far from clear that the evidence sought to be ad-
mitted is the kind that an autonomous rational person would want 
under the circumstances. 
* * * 
Criminal trials require speech—by the agents of both the gov-
ernment and the defendant.  A criminal system that afforded a de-
fendant no opportunity at all to respond to the allegations of the 
government would violate any sensible person’s view of what is re-
quired by due process.  Recognizing the need to allow a defendant to 
respond to the government’s charges, though, does not require that 
the courts must allow the defendant to submit any evidence that he 
wants.  It has long been recognized that courts may put limits on what 
the defendant (and also what the government) may submit to the tri-
er of fact.  As I have attempted to show above, those permissible limits 
are greater than merely excluding evidence which is untrustworthy or 
whose questionable nature cannot be exposed through the adversari-
al process. 
Instead, the Constitution, at least as presently understood, per-
mits courts and legislatures to develop broad, generally applicable 
rules of evidentiary exclusion.  In particular contexts, the Court has 
recognized particularized exceptions: for instance, the right to testify 
created in Rock and the right to put on evidence of third-party guilt 
noted in Holmes.  These particularized examples, however, give little 
support for finding a generalized right to voice. 
Recognizing a right to voice would also do nothing to increase 
the accuracy of criminal trials in the United States, and perhaps 
would undermine it.  Furthermore, giving the defendant a right that 
enables him to admit evidence in a manner that is not open to the 
prosecution—in other words, gaming the rules of evidence in favor of 
the defendant—will do nothing to add to the legitimacy or the ap-
pearance of fairness of the system within our society. 
 
 
 113 See, e.g., RONALD ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 654–57 
(4th ed. 2006). 
